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Abstract
The cross-section of average annual returns on German common stock in the period
of 1881-1913 exhibits several of the patterns that have been observed in more recent U.S.
data. Market beta is hardly important, and its explanatory power is swamped by size
and the ratio of book value to market value. A book-to-market risk measure (covariance
with a portfolio long in high book-to-market rms and short in low book-to-market rms)
has no eect on the explanatory power of the book-to-market characteristic. But the size
eect appears to be caused by selection bias in the sample. And the book-to-market
eect is opposite that of the recent U.S. experience (and, hence, can certainly not be
attributed to selection bias). Finally, a momentum portfolio constructed on the basis of
the error of the basic 3-characteristic model (market beta, size and book-to-market) does
not generate signicant returns. These ndings highlight the variability in the power of
certain characteristics in explaining the cross section of average returns.
Has The Cross-Section of Average Returns
Always Been the Same?
Evidence from Germany, 1881-1913

Peter Bossaerts Caroline Fohlin
1 Introduction
Since the late sixties, nancial economists have been interested in the cross-section of
historical average returns on common stock listed on organized exchanges. The interest
was sparked by a major theoretical nding, namely, that expected excess returns ought
to be proportional to the covariance with the return on the market portfolio. Assuming
that the market's expectations are unbiased, this implies that historical average returns in
excess of the riskfree rate should be proportional to estimates of \betas" (the covariance
with the market portfolio, normalized by the variance of the latter). Soon evidence
emerged that this restriction does not hold for common stock listed on the NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ, and that other characteristics, in particular, size (market capitalization)
and the ratio of book value of equity over market value have additional explanatory power,
marginalizing the eect of beta. Later, it was found that size and book-to-market reect
risk, because historical average returns on portfolios formed on the basis of size and book-
to-market are well explained by the covariance with the market portfolio, the covariance
with a portfolio long in small rms and short in large rms (SLM) and the covariance
with a portfolio long in rms with high ratios book value to market value of equity
and short in rms with correspondingly low ratios (HLM) (Fama and French, 1993 and
1996). This model has become known as the Fama-French 3-factor model.
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Controversy
remains, because recent work nds that the book-to-market ratio itself still explains
variation in average returns beyond these covariances (Daniel and Titman, 1997 { but
see Davis, Fama and French, 2000 for evidence that this is period-specic). That is, the

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As seems to have become standard, we will distinguish between the two approaches as follows: when
market beta, size and book-to-market ratio are to explain the cross-section of average returns, we will
refer to the \3-characteristic model." If betas with respect to the market, the SLM and HLM portfolio
are to explain average returns, then we refer to the \3-factor model."
book-to-market ratio explains part of the error left by the 3-factor model. Moreover, an
additional characteristic, momentum, has explanatory power beyond the 3-factor model
(Fama and French, 1996). Most of the ndings have been corroberated on the basis of
evidence from foreign (non-U.S.) stock markets (Fama and French, 1998).
The goal of this paper is to investigate the stability of the relationship between av-
erage excess returns and the three traditional characteristics (beta, size, and book-to-
market ratio), the HLM covariance (book-to-market factor), and momentum. Evidence
has emerged that the relationship is far from constant (Davis, Fama and French, 2000),
and, more specically, that it varies quite substantially across stock markets in the world
(Hawawini and Keim, 1998). Conrmation of this instability would be disturbing, be-
cause it would dampen expectations that the alleged patterns across stock returns have
useful predictive content. That is, ndings for recent American markets may be unable
to predict patterns in new, hitherto unexplored markets, or even forecast future patterns
in a well-studied market.
The paper studies stock returns in Germany from 1881-1913. The choice of this
market is important for two reasons. First, the time period does not overlap with that
in studies which discovered the size and book-to-market eect in the U.S. (at most
going back to 1929). There is a major methodological advantage of choosing a dierent
time period: there are hardly any informational linkages between the German period
under study and the U.S. period commonly analyzed. It could plausibly be argued
that size and book-to-market eects have recently been present across dierent stock
markets in the world because they all shared similar information ows (the cold war,
increasing importance of international trade in goods and services, common technological
breakthroughs, etc.). The informational background against which the German markets
operated in the period 1881-1913 was vastly dierent. If one discovers size and book-to-
market eects there as well, it cannot be claimed anymore that these factors are caused
by common information ows.
The choice of location, Germany, is also of importance and raises the second moti-
vation for our selection. While Germany had a dierent nancial intermediation system
(universal, relationship banking system), stock markets also played an important role in
nancing investment{contrary to widespread belief. During the period 1881-1913, the
Berlin stock exchange (Berliner Borse), for instance, listed a large and growing number
of companies; about one half the number of listed companies on the NYSE as of 1950,
for an economy whose size was only a fraction of that of the U.S. of the fties. Thus, the
German case is an important historical case of a nancial system that combined strong
banks with active securities markets.
This paper addresses the following specic questions. Is there evidence of size or
book-to-market eects in the cross-section of average returns on common stock listed on
the Berlin exchange in the period 1881-1913? If so, is the nature of the eect the same
as in the recent U.S. history (smaller rms outperform larger ones; high book-to-market
rms outperform low book-to-market rms)? Are they proxies for risk? Is there any
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momentum eect left after taking into account these eects?
The paper reports results based on the rst dataset that has been collected on
company-specic historical data for Germany over 1881-1913. It includes annual returns
on fty companies. There is a strong selection bias in this dataset, because companies
were selected on the basis of continuous listing during the entire period. Based on the
model in Brown, Goetzmann and Ross, 1995, however, we will be able to determine
how selection bias could cause the size and book-to-market eects. If only caused by
selection bias, however, size and book-to-market eects ought to disappear by 1913. A
second dataset is being collected, extending the coverage to monthly returns on 100 rms,
selected randomly and without continuous-listing requirement.
In the analysis, we nd signicant evidence of both a size and book-to-market eect
in the German data. It marginalizes the explanatory power of beta. The size eect is of
the same direction as in recent U.S. data, but disappears by 1913, suggesting that it was
caused by selection bias only. The book-to-market eect is the opposite of that of recent
U.S. data (rms with high book value of equity relative to market value experienced
lower average returns than those with low ratios, ceteris paribus). The magnitude of
the (negative) book-to-market eect remains constant throughout the entire sampling
period, indicating that it never picked up selection bias. As in Daniel and Titman, 1997,
the book-to-market characteristic captures far more than covariance with the portfolio
long in high book-to-market rms and short in low book-to-market rms. When we
construct a momentum portfolio based on the error of our 3-characteristic model, we
nd no evidence signicant returns, however.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey covers the
institutional context of company law and exchange regulations. Section three discusses
the methodology and data used; while section four presents the results. The nal section
draws out some implications of the ndings and suggests avenues for further research.
2 Institutional Background: Company Law and Ex-
change Regulations
There were over 1,000 German joint-stock companies by the early 1870s.
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The numbers
exceeded 3,000 by 1890 and stayed well over 5,000 from the late 1890's at least until
World War I. Throughout the pre-World War I period, a substantial proportion of joint-
stock rms listed their shares on one or more of the several German stock exchanges.
The exchanges also listed many industrial debt securities, particularly those of railway
companies (both foreign and domestic).
Most of the issuing of new securities in Germany proceeded through the universal
banks. While otations could be performed by direct subscription of shares (Zeich-
2
This section borrows from Fohlin (2000).
3
nungsgrundung or successive founding), they were, in practice, usually done by the tak-
ing over of shares by a promoter or underwriter and subsequent sale of the shares to
the public (

Ubernahmegrundung or simultaneous founding). Strict legal stipulations on
new issues for example, the requirement that shares be fully paid up before listing may
have encouraged this form of new share issuing. The practice also led to the holding
of temporary equity stakes by universal bank-underwriters in the rms they oated and
may have also increased banks' access to control rights over shares (proxy voting) and to
seats on company boards (Ausichtsrate).
Price setting changed comparatively little between 1880 and 1913, though the 1884
and 1896 stock exchange laws formalized certain institutions that were already common
practice, at least in Berlin. The exchanges employed two sets of brokers for much of the
nineteenth century: private brokers and ocial brokers (vereidigte Maklern). According
to the 1884 law, the latter were appointed for life terms and were legally prohibited
from trading on their own accounts or joining with other brokers. The ocial brokers
were responsible for setting securities prices based on the unied price system. Under
this procedure, a type of call market, brokers balanced purchase and sale orders and
determined, after a round of price announcements and recalculations, the nal binding
price for all orders placed that day.
Contemporary observers claimed that price setting was not exact or reliable enough
and that, in setting the market price, the brokers often followed the wishes of interested
bankers, especially when a deal could not be executed on the given day (Wiener, 1905).
Indeed, such critics added to the voices calling for reform in the early 1890's. The 1896
law instituted the ocial brokers (called Kursmaklern) and established the unied price
system as the national norm. To the extent that these institutions predated the 1896 law,
however, little change in exchange operations would be expected. The new regulations
also stipulated that prices be ocially set by the exchange directors, in the absence of
outsiders (i.e., only the commissioner, secretary, brokers, directors, and representatives
of other trades prescribed by exchange regulations were permitted to be present).
2.1 Previous historical research
The historical literature has traditionally paid much attention to the role of the universal
banking system in the industrialization of Germany, leaving the securities markets rela-
tively unexplored. While some research maintains that the German secondary markets
remained largely underdeveloped during even the later stages of industrialization (e.g.,
Kennedy, 1987, Michie, 1988, and DeLong and Becht, 1992), little empirical evidence has
been gathered to support this idea. Interrelations between the universal banking system
and securities markets are poorly understood, and the question of market eciency and
the pricing of risk hardly has been raised.
The German experience raises important general issues: rst, whether the combina-
tion of securities underwriting and trading with commercial banking services naturally
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leads to partial internalization of securities trading within banks, and, second, how such
market internalization aects the operation of secondary markets. In investigating the
inuence of nancial institution design on secondary markets, this study goes to the roots
of both the universal banking system and the Berlin stock market
The modern literature on the German stock exchanges is extremely sparse; indeed,
to our knowledge, nobody has undertaken a study like the one we propose. In a series of
papers, Tilly (1986), Kennedy (1991), and Kennedy and Britton (1985) examine portfolio
behavior in Germany. Their research, however, emphasizes risk-return tradeos and e-
cient portfolio diversication. The authors, particularly Tilly, hypothesize that the joint
provision of investment and commercial services characteristic of the German universal
banking system ameliorated problems of asymmetric information and thereby improved
risk management.
DeLong and Becht (1992) take a dierent tack by estimating excess volatility in the
Berlin market over the period from 1876 to 1913 and 1951 to 1990. They nd that perfect
foresight fundamentals overpredict volatility in the pre-war period but underpredict in
the more recent period. The results, they speculate, stem from the role of the universal
banks in intermediating information and substituting for poorly-developed markets. In
particular, they suggest that universal banks were able to convince wary investors of the
desirability (stable yields and market values) of the rms the banks promoted and insured
this outcome by actively managing share prices. Such was the argument of Prion (1910,
1929), who claimed at least for the latter part of the period that nearly all securities
on the exchanges had a \Schutzpatron" (literally, a patron saint), typically a bank, who
consulted daily with the exchange brokers on the determination of the price. The post-
war appearance of excess volatility, in this view, follows from the demise of the banks'
role in the exchanges and the concurrent spread of speculators in the securities markets.
In a similar vein, Wetzel (1996) assesses the impact of the 1896 stock exchange law on
the eciency of the Berlin Borse, comparing volatility ratios before and after the ban on
futures trading.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology
In order to facilitate easy and comprehensive comparison with results from studies of
recent stock market history, we use the Fama-MacBeth methodology when analyzing the
cross-section of average returns on the Berlin Borse in the period 1881-1993.
In the rst stage of the analysis, we project annual returns onto an intercept, beta,
and size and book-to-market characteristics, producing time series of estimates of four
coecients. (Market betas are estimated in a time series projection of each stock's return
onto the return of a proxy of the market portfolio, covering the entire sampling period.)
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We study the (time series) average values of the estimated coecients in the annual cross-
sectional projections, as well as their evolution over time. For example, we investigate
whether the magnitude of the coecient of size decrease over time, as would be expected
if size picks up selection bias.
In a second stage, we project annual returns onto another risk factor as well, in
particular, the covariance with the return on HLM. This will help determine whether the
book-to-market characteristic proxies for risk (we will nd that size captures selection
bias, so that no further analysis needs to be performed).
In a third stage, we study momentum eects. We view momentum as a residual
eect. The presence of a momentum eect will be shown to reveal whether there remains
unexplained cross-sectional variation in average returns. Hence, momentum works as a
diagnostic check, and we compute the average return from a specic momentum portfolio
to test whether we have captured all the cross-sectional variation in mean returns. That
momentum can potentially provide a diagnostic check is corroborated by Chordia and
Shivakumar, 2000, who discovered a statistical model of expected returns that completely
eliminated the momentum eect.
Some of the papers that cover the recent U.S. history (e.g., Fama and French, 1996;
Daniel and Titman, 1997; Davis, Fama and French, 2000) do not use the Fama-MacBeth
methodology. Instead, they use a methodology (Gibbons' methodology) where excess
returns are projected onto risk factors (portfolio returns). The eect of characteristics
(size, book-to-market ratios) are examined by investigating returns on purposely built
portfolios. Gibbons' method has the advantage that it eliminates the estimation error
of betas in the rst step of the Fama-MacBeth methology. Unlike the Fama-MacBeth
methodology, however, it does not force betas to be constant over long periods of time. We
opted for the Fama-MacBeth methodology because we are investigating a long time series
(21 years) of long-horizon (annual) returns. Moreover, it readily allows one to investigate
the additional explanatory power of the book-to-market characteristic by simply adding
it in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure, instead of investigating purposely
built portfolios, a procedure that has recently been shown to bias the results against a
model with risk factors (Berk, 2000).
3.2 Data Sources
The current study uses a sample of 50 rms selected by Rettig (1978) and augmented
by Fohlin (1998). The time period, 1880-1913, is constrained on the early side by the
availability of the necessary nancial data and on the later end by World War I. The
sample is stratied to represent the regional, sectoral, and size variation of Berlin-listed
companies and is restricted to rms in continuous existence (and listing) throughout the
period. This last criterion imparts an obvious selection bias to the data, and we discuss
this issue at length in the following sub-section.
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The analysis requires several types of data: share prices, dividends, book capitaliza-
tion, total assets, reserves, and other nancial information. Annual share prices, along
with the remainder of the necessary data (capitalization, total assets, reserves, annual
dividend, and other nancial data) come from the annual reports of the companies,
reported in both Saling's Borsen-Jahrbuch (part II) and the Handbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften. The former covers all rms listed on the Berlin exchange (begin-
ning in 1876), while the latter reports on every German joint-stock company (beginning
in 1895).
The German stock markets and reporting agencies during this period reported share
prices as the ratio of the market value to the par value of the share, multiplied by 100
(known as the Kurs). Dividend-adjusted return is the annual percentage change in Kurs
plus annual dividends (as a percentage of market value). Dividend-adjusted beta is
the coecient estimate from a regression of dividend-adjusted returns on the dividend-
adjusted market return (taken from Gielen, 1994). For the current sample, the book value
of total equity (the sum of par value of total share capital and reserves) is reported in
aggregate, so the total number and par value of shares is not available separately. Thus,
market value of equity is calculated as the product of the Kurs and the book value of
equity. This method obviously overestimates the market value of all rms. The book-to-
market ratio is calculated as 100/Kurs. Financial performance is the ratio of net income
to book equity, and a dummy variable is dened as 1 when the NI/BE ratio is negative
and zero otherwise. NI+/BE is equal to NI/BE when positive and zero otherwise.
3.3 A Digression on Selection Bias
Our (preliminary) sample has a serious selection bias, because rms are chosen on the
basis of continuous listing over the entire sampling period. It is important to study how
this may inuence a cross-sectional study of average excess returns.
The model in BGIR provides a useful analytical framework. The model assumes
that, in the absence of sampling bias, prices follow a geometric Brownian motion with an
absorbing lower barrier (to reect delisting under distress). If, however, sampling is based
on continuous listing, the measured process will have markedly dierent drift (expected
return), but the same (mean-zero) stochastic component as the original process. In
particular, the following obtains.
 At any point in the sampling period, the bias in the drift is decreasing in the level
of the stock price.
 Given a level of the stock price, the bias in the drift decreases over time, and
disappears by the end of the sampling period.
 The measurement of risk (covariance with the market portfolio or any other port-
folio that reects aggregate risk) is not aected.
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The last observation holds only locally, i.e., if returns are measured over short intervals.
If, however, delisting risk is idiosyncratic (unrelated to aggregate risk), the observation
will obtain over longer intervals as well.
What do these ndings imply about patterns in the cross-section of average returns
of a sample that is aected by selection bias?
 Since size (market capitalization) is highly correlated with the stock price, selection
bias will induce the very size eect that is present in recent U.S. data: the average
returns (drift) are decreasing in price, and, hence, size.
 Likewise, to the extent that book value over market value of equity correlates (nega-
tively) with price, selection bias will induce the positive book-to-market eect that
one observes in recent U.S. data: the average returns are decreasing in price, and,
hence, increases in the ratio of book value over market value of equity.
 If the size eect and/or book-to-market eects are caused by selection bias, they
ought to disappear by the end of the sampling period.
 To the extent that covariances with the market portfolio, SLM, or HLM reect
aggregate risk that is priced, their eect should show up irrespective of selection
biases. E.g., if the covariance with the market portfolio is priced risk, then this
should show up in (cross-sectional) projections of excess returns onto market \beta."
Likewise, if covariance with the SLM portfolio represents priced risk, then it should
show up in the projections.
 There should not be any bias in the estimation of the price of covariance risk. E.g.,
if covariance with the SLM portfolio is priced risk, it must not disappear over time,
unlike the size eect itself (if the latter was caused by selection bias).
 The only eect of continuous-listing selection bias on the cross-sectional prejections
of average returns is that it lowers the explanatory power of covariance risk (lower
R
2
s) and it marginalizes its signicance.
3.4 A Digression On Momentum
Over the last ten years, evidence has been growing that there is a strong momentum
eect in U.S. stock returns since the late 1920s. That is, a portfolio long in recent
winners and short in recent losers generates signicant positive returns. In fact, this
momentum eect is to be expected whenever there is any cross-sectional variation in
mean returns. Indeed, the expected return on a momentum index is determined directly
by the spread (variance) of mean returns in cross-section. To see this, assume that returns
are independently and identically distributed over time. Let R
n;t
denote the return on
asset n over period t. Let 
n
denote the expected return, assumed constant over time:

n
= E[R
n;t
]. Dene the momentum portfolio for period t + 1 as follows. The weight
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on security n is (R
n;t
  R
E;t
)=N , where R
E;t
is the prior-period return on an equally
weighted portfolio of all securities. In words, security n receives a weight proportional to
how much it outperformed an equally-weighted index in the previous period. Since
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
 R
E;t
)=N
=
 
1
N
N
X
n=1
R
n;t
!
  R
E;t
= R
E;t
  R
E;t
= 0;
this is a zero-investment portfolio (the weights add up to zero). This also means that
the weights ought to be interpreted as number of dollars invested in each security. Next
period's (dollar) payo on the momentum index, R
mom
t
, will be
R
mom
t
=
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  R
M;t
)R
n;t+1
=N:
The expected payo is:
E[R
mom
t
]
= E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  R
E;t
)R
n;t+1
]
= E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  R
E;t
)(R
n;t+1
  
n
)]
+ E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  R
E;t
)
n
]
=
1
N
N
X
n=1

2
n
  E[R
E;t
]
1
N
N
X
n=1

n
=
1
N
N
X
n=1

2
n
 
 
1
N
N
X
n=1

n
!
2
> 0:
Consequently, the expected payo equals the cross-sectional variance of mean returns.
If there is any dierence in mean returns across securities, the momentum index will
generate a positive payo on average. Therefore, if momentum portfolios have historically
generated large positive returns, this proves indirectly that there have been signicant
dierences in mean returns.
We can exploit this mathematical fact to use momentum as a diagnostic check of
whether we have explained all the cross-sectional variation in mean returns, as follows.
Let 
e
n
denote the expected return on security n predicted by our empirical asset pricing
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model (we'll use the three-factor model, where beta, size and book-to-market explains
the cross-section of mean returns). Allow for a potential pricing error 
n
, where

n
= 
n
  
e
n
:
Assume that our empirical asset pricing model at least prices securities correctly on
average:
1
N
N
X
n=1

n
= 0:
The following momentum portfolio exploits the potential presence of pricing errors, be-
cause it will generate signicant positive returns if there are indeed pricing errors. Dene
the weight on security n to be
(R
n;t
  
e
n
)=N: (1)
It is straightforward to show that this \momentum" index is a zero-investment portfolio.
Now compute its expected payo in excess of what our empirical asset pricing model
would predict:
E[
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  
e
n
)R
n;t+1
=N ]  E[
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  
e
n
)
e
n
=N ]
= E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  
e
n
)(R
n;t+1
  
n
)]
+ E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  
e
n
)
n
]
= E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(R
n;t
  
n
)
n
]
+ E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(
n
)
2
]
= E[
1
N
N
X
n=1
(
n
)
2
]
> 0:
The implication is clear: the bigger the mispricing of the asset pricing model, the bigger
the outperformance of the momentum index.
The foregoing demonstrates that the performance of specic momentum portfolios
can be used as diagnostic test for an asset pricing model. That is, payos on momentum
indices can be used as the basis of specication tests. We will apply such a test later on.
4 Results
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the variables to be used in the cross-sectional
analysis of average stock returns. There is enough variation in the explanatory variables
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(market value of equity; book-to-market ratio) for the cross-sectional regressions to be
meaningful. One outlier, with returns of 1,303.33 percent in 1884, was omitted.
Figure 1 plots the time series of dividend-adjusted returns on all 50 rms (dots) and
the market index (circles). The spread of the returns on the 50 rms around the return
of the market suggests that the 50 rms are typical. There is a survivorship bias in the
sample of 50 rms, however. Figure 2 highlights this bias: the average return on the
50 rms is higher than those on the index in earlier years. One could conjecture that
part of the dierence in average returns may have to be attributed to the fact that the
average return on the 50 rms is based on equal weighting, while the market index we
use is value weighted. Equal weighting imposes a relatively higher weighting on smaller
rms, which in recent U.S. history have outperformed larger rms.
Contrary to this conjecture, however, Table II documents that small rms (quintile
1) in fact had a lower average return (7.46% p.a.) than large rms (quintile 2: 14.03%
p.a.). The numbers in the table are remarkable, when contrasted with recent U.S. data.
While small rms are more risky (as measured with standard deviation), they generate
smaller average returns. Moreover, unlike in recent U.S. data, there is not a monotonically
negative relationship between size and beta. The beta of our largest rms is higher than
that of our smallest rms. The middle quintiles generate the lowest betas. Still, like in
U.S. data, the book-to-market of the smallest rms is substantially higher than that of
other rms. The net income (as percentage of book value of equity) is lower for small
rms, indicating that some of them are really rms in distress, as in recent U.S. data
(Fama and French, 1995).
Table II also provides descriptive statistics for groups of rms ranked by estimated
beta. As in recent U.S. data, there is a slight negative relationship between mean return
and beta (we will determine the signicance later). There is no relationship between beta
and size, unlike in recent U.S. data.
Table III paints a more complete picture of the correlations between the various return
and rm characteristics. The slight negative relationship between beta and return re-
appears, but is insignicant (p = 0:17). The correlation between beta and size is positive
(unlike in recent U.S. data) and signicant (p < 0:01), as is the correlation between beta
and book-to-market.
As in recent U.S. data, the relationship between return and size is positive, but it
is not signicant. More striking is the signicant, negative correlation between book-to-
market and return: unlike in recent U.S. data, rms with high levels of book value relative
to market value of equity generate lower returns.
4.1 Baseline Multi-Characteristic Models
Table IV translates all this in the more familiar Fama-Macbeth two-step regression re-
sults. Robust-regression and OLS-regression results are displayed, although the dier-
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ences are minor.
The negative, albeit insignicant relation between return and beta is prominent. This
conrms ndings in recent U.S. data. In multivariate prjections of return onto beta, size
and book-to-market, the relation with beta becomes positive, but remains insignicant.
The usual size eect appears (small rms generate higher returns on average) and is
signicant. The book-to-market eect, however, is opposite that of the U.S. The size
eect is absorbed by two additional explanatory variables, however: (i) earnings to book
value of equity; (ii) earnings (when positive) as a percentage of book value.
The size eect could have been caused by survivorship bias, as explained earlier. The
book-to-market eect cannot be attributed to survivorship bias, because it is of opposite
sign than expected. If the size eect has indeed been caused by sample bias, we ought
to observe a decline over time. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the coecient in the
multivariate regressions of return onto beta, size and book-to-market. The magnitude
of the coecient declines over time, conrming our conjecture that size picks up the
survivorhip bias.
There is no evidence that the book-to-market eect changes over time. Figure 4
documents that the coecient to book-to-market remained equally strong during the
entire sampling period. It is negative in all but one year.
The weakness of the relationship between beta and market return might be at-
tributable to estimation error. We estimated betas from the time series of annual returns
on each rm individually, instead of assigning betas estimated from groups of betas.
Still, the coecient to beta in the cross-sectional regression of return on beta, size and
book-to-market is estimated fairly accurately. In principle, it should recover the actual
return on the market index. Figure 5 demonstrates that there is indeed little dierence
between the estimated coecients to beta and the annual market return. Because the
dierence is so small, we might attribute the lack of signicance of the average coecient
to the volatility of the market index. However, over the 33-year period, the average
return on the market index was 7.6%. With a volatility of 8.7% p.a., this average is
signicantly positive at p < 0:01. Hence, the weakness of the relation between return
and beta cannot be attributed to the volatility in the market index. It is very hard to
nd any evidence of a signicant relationship, and, hence, conrm the CAPM; but there
is no purely statistical reason for this failure.
4.2 Book-to-Market Beta
While the size eect appears to be related to selection bias in our sample, the book-
to-market eect is genuine. Consequently, it deserves closer scrutiny. In particular, we
should investigate whether the book-to-market ratio proxies for risk. We do this by
estimating a second beta, namely, the beta relative to the Fama-French HLM portfolio,
and including this beta in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. If the book-
to-market eect reects risk, it is hoped that it can be captured by the HLM beta. In the
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analysis, we construct the HLM as an equally weighted portfolio, long in the top quintile
of rms ranked by book-to-market, and short in rms in the bottom quintile.
The last column in Table IV lists the estimation results in the second step of the
Fama-MacBeth procedure. Evidently, the HLM beta has no impact on the book-to-
market eect. Moreover, its coecient is insignicant on average. This corroborates
recent U.S. history (Daniel and Titman, 1997), but is contrary to earlier U.S. history
(Davis, Fama and French, 2000).
4.3 Momentum Portfolio Returns
To determine whether our 3-characteristic model (market beta, size and book-to-market)
captures the cross-sectional variation in mean returns, we implement the momentum
portfolio in (??) and test whether its average return is zero. We nd that the average
annual return is 7.3%. With a standard error of 54%, this is hardly signicant (p = 0:23).
Figure 6 plots the evolution of the return on this momentum portfolio against that
of the market. While the momentum portfolio is more volatile than the market, the lack
of signicance of its average return cannot be attributed to a few outliers. Only in later
years (after 1900) are the returns on the momentum portfolio predominantly positive.
From this result, we conclude that our model captures most of the cross-sectional
variation in mean returns.
5 Conclusion
We discover several commonalities but also a few dierences between recent stock market
experience and annual data of returns on common stock listed on the Berlin Borse in
the period 1880-1913. In particular, size and book-to-market eects appear prominently,
and beta performs weakly, in our models. At the same time, the book-to-market eect
runs the opposite of recent experience in the US, and the momentum portfolio yields
an insignicant return. In addition, the size eect, since it disappears by the end of
the sample period, is attributable to selection bias. While the presence of common
eects (e.g., the book-to-market characteristic) might indicate the importance of studying
theoretical{perhaps behavioral{explanations, the dierences in the magnitude or even
direction of these eects suggests they may in fact merely be confounding inuences.
Theoretical exercises may therefore prove futile in any general sense.
While any comparison across historical periods and locations must be interpreted
with care, the parallels and disparities that we nd support the conclusion of recent
international comparisons of the cross-sectional behavior of returns, namely, that (i)
beta, size and book-to-market are important explanatory variables, but (ii) the nature of
the relationship between return and these explanatory variables varies. Thus, it appears
13
that ndings for the US in the post-World War II period have limited predictive power
for other markets, and perhaps even for the US itself.
Further research is needed to bolster such conclusions and to help determine the
impact of outside inuences{such as nancial system design or market microstructure{
on returns. In particular, future work should concentrate on gathering and analyzing
larger samples for the German and other non-US markets in the period before World
War I as well as studying the US markets themselves in the same period. By placing the
German historical experience in perspective with American markets of the same time,
we can better distinguish between system eects and time-period eects.
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Table I
Size, Book-to-Market Ratio, and Returns: 50 Long-Lived Firms, 1880-1913
Market equity is the price of shares times the book value of shares and reserves.  B/M ratio is book value of equity divided by
market value of equity.  Dividend-adjusted return is the percentage increase in share price plus dividend (as percent of market
value) and omits one observation f 1,303.33 percent in 1884.  Marks during this time can be multiplied by three to obtain a rough
estimate of 2000 dollar values.  (Source: Saling’s Börsen-Jahrbuch (1881-1914); from Rettig (1978) and Fohlin (1994)). 
year Market equity 
(millions of marks)
Book-to-market ratio Dividend-adjusted returns 
(percent per annum)
avg sd min max avg sd min max avg sd min max
1880 4.99 6.39 0.31 28.88 1.55 1.45 0.57 9.30 - - - -
1881 5.64 7.46 0.22 31.78 1.54 2.10 0.53 13.79 16.50 23.95 -32.56 91.50
1882 6.71 8.95 0.13 41.33 1.68 3.75 0.55 25.64 17.86 27.09 -46.21 94.33
1883 7.11 9.00 0.09 40.02 1.77 4.85 0.50 33.33 14.87 20.87 -23.08 66.69
1884 7.80 9.70 0.31 38.97 0.97 0.56 0.42 2.38 14.22 25.34 -41.14 82.80
1885 7.84 9.82 0.33 41.56 1.05 0.64 0.37 3.22 7.49 14.70 -26.13 41.03
1886 8.89 11.73 0.54 53.13 0.92 0.53 0.17 2.78 22.35 35.23 -30.49 154.93
1887 8.67 11.38 0.49 47.67 1.02 0.66 0.27 3.57 4.89 19.75 -47.17 57.13
1888 10.86 12.89 0.69 60.26 0.79 0.53 0.26 3.51 33.07 29.58 -7.38 127.62
1889 14.60 20.21 1.06 107.29 0.68 0.29 0.26 1.51 28.79 49.78 -20.14 296.49
1890 14.51 19.28 0.92 79.00 0.80 0.37 0.27 1.72 -5.50 16.07 -44.47 25.32
1891 12.41 15.66 0.69 65.42 0.97 0.57 0.40 3.70 -3.63 16.05 -52.53 30.58
1892 11.41 13.87 0.51 54.96 0.92 0.45 0.31 2.36 14.43 39.69 -39.43 236.41
1893 12.58 15.93 0.36 63.19 0.93 0.54 0.31 2.99 11.74 13.76 -27.42 40.59
1894 13.48 16.79 0.36 67.71 0.82 0.46 0.26 2.90 19.47 21.80 -36.92 91.50
1895 15.49 19.92 0.94 82.87 0.71 0.37 0.22 2.38 21.75 15.87 -5.31 61.55
1896 17.85 23.48 0.41 93.88 0.66 0.33 0.19 2.17 18.20 14.46 -12.38 52.06
1897 20.92 30.66 0.56 128.69 0.66 0.34 0.21 1.50 16.52 20.51 -36.08 69.39
1898 24.79 39.61 0.45 176.56 0.65 0.33 0.21 1.59 13.80 15.74 -18.51 74.62
1899 28.26 44.13 0.56 210.41 0.63 0.32 0.21 1.79 13.99 18.35 -37.34 77.82
1900 24.37 38.15 0.40 161.13 0.72 0.34 0.20 1.63 0.65 15.30 -32.04 50.15
1901 24.68 38.34 0.52 174.17 0.78 0.38 0.22 1.84 1.21 12.91 -24.99 35.78
1902 26.68 41.19 0.34 184.69 0.73 0.36 0.21 1.79 14.82 14.28 -9.29 60.26
1903 30.88 47.74 0.37 189.62 0.70 0.37 0.17 1.83 18.91 15.54 -10.89 59.38
1904 34.16 54.10 0.57 246.99 0.64 0.36 0.17 1.86 19.42 17.08 -20.33 57.23
1905 36.68 57.41 0.56 241.73 0.60 0.33 0.19 1.61 14.00 12.31 -21.21 45.82
1906 38.44 63.26 0.61 295.18 0.62 0.35 0.18 1.90 10.81 15.67 -42.10 45.39
1907 35.78 57.27 0.42 269.79 0.69 0.38 0.19 2.25 0.15 15.39 -33.02 50.71
1908 36.26 61.16 0.35 301.53 0.73 0.47 0.20 2.70 8.46 18.09 -50.34 45.25
1909 41.47 67.26 0.45 311.17 0.63 0.34 0.18 1.95 20.28 13.51 -19.42 52.62
1910 39.91 68.77 0.41 360.32 0.67 0.33 0.25 1.59 7.02 12.94 -23.11 32.33
1911 45.71 82.30 0.42 472.59 0.67 0.41 0.18 2.19 10.78 17.70 -32.29 76.62
1912 43.55 79.27 0.45 464.03 0.78 0.64 0.20 3.64 0.28 14.75 -44.78 28.59
1913 46.43 92.79 0.30 582.30 0.88 0.96 0.20 6.62 7.37 23.83 -52.81 98.18
All
years 22.81 45.30 0.09 582.30 0.86 1.21 0.17 33.33 12.51 22.90 -52.81 296.49
Table II
Descriptive Statistics by Size and Beta Ranking
In panel A, the sample is divided into five groups of ten firms each, ranked in increasing order of size (measured as market value of equity).  In panel B, the firms are similarly ranked
based on dividend-adjusted beta.  One outlier firm is eliminated from the sample (size rank 1 and beta rank 5).  B/M ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity.
Dividend-adjusted return is the percentage increase in share price plus dividend (as percent of market value).  
Panel A: Ranked by size 1 2 3 4 5
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dividend-adjusted returns 7.46 34.07 14.45 19.43 11.87 14.44 15.14 20.23 14.03 20.01
Dividend-adjusted beta 1.26 1.17 0.60 0.42 0.70 0.41 0.61 0.59 1.46 0.85
Ln(market equity) 14.21 0.63 15.31 0.62 15.82 0.74 16.65 0.75 17.78 1.01
Market equity (millions of marks) 1.77 1.01 5.26 2.93 9.30 5.56 22.30 17.23 81.68 79.84
Ln(book-to-market) 0.19 0.42 -0.33 0.48 -0.53 0.42 -0.63 0.49 -0.58 0.43
Book-to-market 1.33 0.67 0.81 0.47 0.64 0.27 0.60 0.33 0.62 0.31
Net income/book equity 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.05
Dummy variable (NI/BE neg=1) 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11
NI+/BE 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.05
Average N 290 338 324 332 305
Panel B: Ranked by beta 1 2 3 4 5
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dividend-adjusted returns 16.25 24.53 9.38 17.68 14.80 16.83 11.89 20.09 10.75 31.31
Dividend-adjusted beta 0.06 0.19 0.49 0.12 0.82 0.12 1.17 0.14 2.27 0.87
Ln(market equity) 15.83 1.02 15.70 1.45 16.08 1.26 16.29 1.43 15.86 1.75
Market equity (millions of marks) 11.98 12.13 20.84 42.05 20.56 29.44 36.12 72.42 28.58 48.42
Ln(book-to-market) -0.51 0.57 -0.36 0.41 -0.46 0.56 -0.43 0.50 -0.10 0.54
Book-to-market 0.70 0.42 0.77 0.40 0.75 0.51 0.75 0.54 1.05 0.59
Net income/book equity 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.10
Dummy variable (NI/BE neg=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.23
NI+/BE 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.08
Average N 335 329 335 313 275
Table III
Pairwise Correlation Coefficients for Pooled Cross Section-Time Series 
Significance l vels of correlation coefficients are in italics.  The bottom number in each row is the number of observations available
for each correlation.  One outlier firm is removed.  B/M ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity.  Dividend-
adjusted return is the percentage increase in share price plus dividend (as percent of market value).  
Dividend-
adjusted return
Dividend-
adjusted beta
Market value of
equity
Book-to-market
value of equity
Dividend-adjusted beta -0.04
0.17
1,480
Market value of equity 0.02
0.54
1,480
0.17
0.00
1,557
Book-to-market value of
equity
-0.33
0.00
1,480
0.21
0.00
1,557
-0.25
0.00
1,557
Net income/book equity 0.46
0.00
1,479
-0.17
0.00
1,597
0.05
0.04
1,556
-0.57
0.00
1,556
Table IV
Average Coefficient Estimates from Annual Cross-Section Regressions
Coefficients are averages over annual observations.  All models include a constant (not reported).  P-values of one-sided t-tests are
in italics below coefficient means.  Beta is estimated for each firm over the full period.  ME is the market value of equity, and
BE/ME is the ratio of book-to-market values of equity.  E/BE is the ratio of net income to book value of equity.  E/BE dummy is
one when E/BE is negative and zero otherwise.  E(+)/BE is equal to E/BE when that value is positive and is zero otherwise.  Robust
in the column heading indicates the use of a limited-influence estimator (Huber/bi-weight) in the underlying cross-sectional
regressions.  The estimator is described in the text.
Robust OLS Robust Robust Robust
Beta -0.90
0.27
1.88
0.17
1.84
0.09
1.42
0.15
1.08
0.21
ln(ME) -1.96
0.00
-1.43
0.00
-0.36
0.19
-1.24
0.00
ln(BE/ME) -18.83
0.00
-19.44
0.00
-8.50
0.00
-19.26
0.00
E/BE dummy -7.80
0.01
E(+)/BE 76.36
0.00
Beta (BM beta) 1.50
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Figure 1. Dividend-AdjustedReturns. This figurepresentsthe dividend-adjusted
returns on the sample of 50 long-lived firms as well as on the market index.
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Figure 2. Differencein AverageDividend-AdjustedReturns. This figure
presentsthedifferencebetweenaverageannualdividend-adjustedreturnsfor the
sample of 50 long-lived firms and the market portfolio.
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Figure3.RobustCoefficientEstimatesof LoggedMarketEquity. Thisfigurepresentsthe
estimatedcoefficientson loggedmarketequityfromrobustregressionsof dividend-adjusted
returns on beta, logged market equity, and logged book-to-market ratios.
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Figure 4. RobustCoefficientEstimatesof LoggedMarket-to-BookRatio. This figure
presentstheestimatedcoefficientsonloggedmarket-to-bookratiofromrobustregressionsof
dividend-adjusted returns on beta, logged market equity, and logged book-to-market ratios.
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Figure5. RobustCoefficientEstimatesof Beta. Thisfigurepresentstheestimated
coefficientson betafromrobustregressionsof dividend-adjustedreturnson beta,
logged market equity, and logged book-to-market ratios.
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Figure 6. Return on MomentumPortfolio. This figurepresentsthedividend-
adjustedreturnonthemomentumportfolio(longintop-20percent;shortinbottom-20
percent stocks using regression residuals) as well as the dividend-adjusted return on the 
